This sketch of his life and work has been published in the hope that it may induce some readers to seek a closer acquaintance with his writings.

In this paper, I state the what I call the “problem of life after death,” survey some responses to it, and highlight a way in which the field might progress. Put simply, the problem of life after death is the problem of reconciling the fact that when we die, we will be totally destroyed with the belief that we will exist again at some time after our deaths. Contemporary solutions to the problem have focussed on the “logical” version of this (...) problem. I highlight that the problem would be better thought of as an evidential problem. (shrink)

Comment Spinoza peut-il être encore aujourd'hui notre "contemporain"? Les études ici rassemblées proposent plusieurs types de réponses à cette question au coeur des relations entre la philosophie et son histoire. C'est d'abord la persistance d'un dialogue entre les philosophes contemporains (Deleuze, Derrida, Milner, Negri...) et Spinoza. C'est la mise en évidence du soubassement classique de questions éthiques contemporaines (la nature du scepticisme, le bonheur, l'immortalité prothétique dans l'indéfinie différance de la mort). C'est surtout (telle est la thèse générale de (...) l'ouvrage) une vision de la politique selon l'extériorité, l'immanence et la loi quantitative du "compte". Quand les "valeurs" (derniers restes de la transcendance) sont source de violence, les comptes démocratiques sont source de paix. La démocratie comme "régime absolu", pour reprendre les derniers mots de Spinoza, est encore devant nous. (shrink)

Can we learn without consciousness? When the eminent neuropsychologist, Lawrence Weiskrantz first coined the term 'blindsight' to describe a condition whereby a patient could demonstrate that they were aware of some object, yet insist that they were completely unaware of its existence, the response from some in the scientific community was one of extreme skepticism. Even now, there are those who question the existence of unconscious learning, and the topic remains one of the most actively researched and debated in psychology. (...) In recent years evidence for unconscious processing across a range of sensory modalities have come from studies of vision, audition, memory, emotion, and action. Never before have these studies of unconscious processing in the different senses been brought together into a single volume. In a book dedicated to Lawrence Weiskrantz, some of the leading psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists of the day explain what we know about unconscious processing in the different senses. Including contributions from, amongst others, David Milner, Jon Driver, Alan Cowey, and Ray Dolan, the book presents a state of the art account of what we now know about 'the unconscious'. The book will provide a fascinating account for students and researchers in psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Francis Bacon: The Theological Foundations of Valerius TerminusBenjamin MilnerFrancis Bacon’s Great Instauration for learning and the sciences, formally launched with the publication of Novum Organum (1620), may fairly be said to have commenced fifteen years earlier with the publication of The Proficience and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Human (1605), which, revised and translated into Latin as De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623), became an integral part of the (...) Instauration. A few years earlier, however, Bacon made an attempt to formulate his philosophy of nature, or science, in a work which he evidently planned to publish but never did—Valerius Terminus: Of the Interpretation of Nature with the Annotations of Hermes Stella (1603?). 1 Fragmentary as it is, this work contains the ingredients of Bacon’s natural philosophy, although they are not in all respects identical with those of the later works which superseded it. The most distinctive feature of Valerius, however, is its disclosure of Bacon’s original interest in setting his program for the advancement of science on a theological footing. 2 What the nature of that foundation is, why Bacon thought it necessary, and why it was abandoned are questions that, as I shall try to show, are principally answered by an analysis of two earlier works, the Meditationes Sacrae (1597), the unpublished Confession of Faith (1602?), and Valerius Terminus itself.Bacon’s first published work actually comprises three different texts: one on rhetoric, Colors of Good and Evil; a collection of Essays; and Meditationes Sacrae. Of these, Meditationes fared most poorly in subsequent years. It was never translated into English by Bacon himself and was soon severed from the [End Page 245] Essays (VII, 229). Rarely commented upon, it has apparently been dismissed as having any significance for our understanding of Bacon’s thought, but a second look will show that this is not the case.There are twelve meditations, each of which has a biblical text, and the homilies that follow reflect biblical teaching. They have quite a range: “the works of God and the works of man,” “the miracles of our savior,” “the exaltation of charity,” “of earthly hope,” “of hypocrites,” “of heresies,” “the church and the scriptures”; but it is clear that two themes—Charity and Heresy—subsume the rest.Charity is not merely a thought or feeling but the actual performance of good works, the demand for which—in the life of the believer—is total: unless your work is God’s work “thou shalt work in pain and distress, and thou shalt look back upon thy work with disgust and reproach” (VII, 243). Three successive meditations deal explicitly with hypocrisy in religion, but Bacon brings each of these under the rubric of good works, deriding those who are ostentatious in the celebration and observation of ritual detail and cultic practice but who ignore the commandment to love their neighbor. The works of Jesus furnish the best model: all his miracles, Bacon keenly observes, “were for the benefit of the human body, his doctrine for the benefit of the human soul” (VII, 244). The religion espoused is one of good works, and Bacon invokes here, as elsewhere, the well-known definition of James (Jas.I.27): “pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the orphans and widows in their affliction” (VII, 249).“Heresy” is the subject of the second group of meditations, but in these Bacon intends not so much to condemn or to exhort as to lay down theological positions. The text of the first, “Of Atheism,” is taken from Psalms 14.1: “the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.” But this is not what the fool has thought, Bacon insists, only what he has said. “That is, it is not so much that he feels it inwardly as that he wishes to believe it.” Strive as he may to do so, however, “there remains in him that sparkle of original light (igniculus luminis primi) whereby we acknowledge a divinity, to extinguish which utterly, and pluck the instinct (stimulum) out of his heart, he strives in vain.” It is not “out of his natural sense and judgment” that... (shrink)

Should engineering ethics be taught? Despite the obvious truism that we all want our students to be moral engineers who practice virtuous professional behavior, I argue, in this article that the question itself obscures several ambiguities that prompt preliminary resolution. Upon clarification of these ambiguities, and an attempt to delineate key issues that make the question a philosophically interesting one, I conclude that engineering ethics not only should not, but cannot, be taught if we understand “teaching engineering ethics” to mean (...) training engineers to be moral individuals (as some advocates seem to have proposed). However, I also conclude that there is a justification to teaching engineering ethics, insofar as we are able to clearly identify the most desirable and efficacious pedagogical approach to the subject area, which I propose to be a case study-based format that utilizes the principle of human cognitive pattern recognition. (shrink)

Two nurses diagnosed with opioid addiction launched legal action after being found guilty of unprofessional conduct due to addiction‐related behaviors. When covered by the media, their cases sparked both public and legal controversies. We are curious about the broader discursive framings that led to these strong reactions, and analyze the underlying structures of knowledge and power that shape the issue of opioid addiction in the profession of nursing through a critical discourse analysis of popular media, legal blogs and hearing tribunals. (...) We argue that addiction in nursing is framed as personal choice, as a failure in the moral character of the nurses, as decontextualized from addiction as disease arguments, and as an individualized issue devoid of contextual factors leading to addiction. Our investigation offers a critical case study of a nursing regulatory body that upheld popular assumptions of addiction as an autonomous, rational choice replete with individual‐based consequences – a framing that is inconsistent with evidence‐based practice in health‐care. We put forth this critical interrogation to open up possibilities for counterdiscourses that may promote more nuanced and effective responses to the issue of addiction in nursing. (shrink)

Although the mechanics of how the eye works are well understood, debate still exists as to how the complex machinery of the brain interprets neural impulses...

In his paper ‘Mind, Mortality and Material Being’ Paul Anders attempts to show that Peter van Inwagen’s materialist metaphysics of the human person, combined with the belief that human persons survive death, faces a dilemma. Either, on the one hand, van Inwagen has to accept an account of the survival of human persons across death that cannot escape the duplication objection, or, on the other hand, van Inwagen has to accept an account of the survival of human persons across death (...) that entails the possibility of that which is logically impossible and, in consequence, renders his metaphysics necessarily false. This paper is concerned with the second horn of the dilemma. In this paper, I will attempt to do two things. First, I will attempt to show that Anders’ description of van Inwagen’s ‘naked kernel’ account of the survival of human persons across death is, at times, unclear, before, second, attempting to demonstrate that there is a response that van Inwagen could give to Anders’ argument regardless of these unclarities. Consequently, I think that, at least until Anders’ description is made clearer, and until Anders tells us why van Inwagen can’t opt for the solution I propose, we should consider van Inwagen’s inclination that God can preserve a kernel that is sufficient for the survival of human persons across death to be unharmed by Anders’ argument. (shrink)

In Chapter 4 of his essay Utilitarianism, “Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is susceptible,” J. S. Mill undertakes to prove, in some sense of that term, the principle of utility. It has very commonly been argued that in the course of this “proof” Mill commits two very obvious fallacies. The first is the naturalistic fallacy which he is held to commit when he argues that since “the only proof capable of being given that an object is (...) visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner … the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.”1 Here Mill appears to hold that “X is desirable ”—a value judgment—follows deductively from “People desire x”—a factual statement. And the second is the fallacy of composition which seems to be involved in Mill'zs argument that since “each person's happiness is a good to that person … the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.”2. (shrink)

First published in 1995, The Visual Brain in Action remains a seminal publication in the cognitive sciences. For this new edition, a very substantial and illustrated epilogue has been added to the book in which Milner and Goodale review the key developments that support or challenge the views that were put forward in the first edition.

First published in 1995, The Visual Brain in Action remains a seminal publication in the cognitive sciences. It presents a model for understanding the visual processing underlying perception and action, proposing a broad distinction within the brain between two kinds of vision: conscious perception and unconscious 'online' vision. It argues that each kind of vision can occur quasi-independently of the other, and is separately handled by a quite different processing system. In the 11 years since publication, the book has provoked (...) considerable interest and debate - throughout both cognitive neuroscience and philosophy, while the field has continued to flourish and develop. -/- For this new edition, the text from the original edition has been left untouched, standing as a coherent statement of the authors' position. However, a very substantial epilogue has been added to the book in which Milner and Goodale review some of the key developments that support or challenge the views that were put forward in the first edition. The new chapter summarizes developments in various relevant areas of psychology, neuroscience and behaviour. It notably supplements the main text by updating the reader on the contributions that have emerged from the use of functional neuroimaging, which was in its infancy when the first edition was written. Neuroimaging, and functional MRI in particular, has revolutionized the field over the past 11 years by allowing investigators to plot in detail the patterns of activity within the visual brains of behaving and perceiving humans. The authors show how its use now allows scientists to test and confirm their proposals, based as they then were largely on evidence accrued from primate neuroscience in conjunction with studies of neurological patients. (shrink)

There is growing interest in examining dark personality traits, to better explain malevolent and self-serving behaviour patterns commonly observed in clinical and non-clinical settings. Recently, taxonomies of dark personalities have been developed, along with psychometric tools to measure and delineate between traits including psychopathy, Machiavellianism and narcissism. The extent to which these constructs are distinct or overlapping remains controversial. Psychophysiological research can improve understanding of biological mechanisms contributing to personality that may help to evaluate taxonomies. This study investigated diurnal variations (...) in salivary cortisol (on waking, cortisol awakening response, and at bedtime, over two days) and their relationship to personality traits (Short Dark Triad Scale and IPIP Mini), psychopathology (Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale; DASS) and quality of life (WHOQOL-BREF) in a non-clinical sample (N=45, 26 females, 19 males, 18-59 years). Dark personality traits correlated with low bedtime cortisol, reduced sleep, depression and poorer quality of life. Hierarchical linear regressions analyses indicated that bedtime cortisol levels significantly accounted for variance in Psychopathy (F(1,39)=5.55, p=.02, R=.52, B=-1.81, 95% CI [-3.37-(-.26)], β=-.33, sr2=.10) and reduced sleep uniquely accounted for variance Machiavellianism (F(2,40)=5.99, p=.01, R=.48, B=1.01, 95% CI [.16-2.02], β=.34, sr2=.11). These data provide preliminary evidence that supports the cortisol hypoarousal hypothesis of Psychopathy and has identified a link between Machiavellianism, sleep-wake cycles, and chronotype. The hypoarousal hypothesis of Psychopathy contends that the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis is unresponsive to the stress of social engagement. Machiavellianism was predicted by longer days with evidence for an evening chronotype. These findings indicated that the Dark Triad traits have different underlying biological mechanisms that require further exploration. (shrink)

According to the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception, we must possess concepts for all the objects, properties and relations which feature in our perceptual experiences. In this paper, I investigate the possibility of developing an argument against the conceptualist view by appealing to the notion of attention. In Part One, I begin by setting out an apparently promising version of such an argument, a version which appeals to a link between attention and perceptual demonstrative concept possession. In Part (...) Two, however, I show how the conceptualist can challenge what appears to be the key premise of the argument, and I go on to describe, in Part Three, an important further difficulty which we face if we attempt to overcome this challenge in a particular way. My conclusion will be that the conceptualist's challenge to the argument is convincing and hence that the argument remains inconclusive. (shrink)